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Abstract

This article explores the long-forgotten Altoona Conference of 1862, when nearly a dozen Union governors
met at the Civil War's darkest hour to discuss war strategy and, ultimately, reaffirm their support for the Union
cause. This article examines and questions the conventional view of the conference as a challenge to President
Lincoln's efficacy as the nation's leader. Rather, the article suggests that Lincoln may have actually welcomed
the conference and had his own designs for how it might bolster his political objectives.
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“ALTOONA WAS HIS, AND FAIRLY WON”:
PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE ALTOONA
GOVERNORS’ CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 1862
Kees Thompson
When the first shells blasted into the walls of Fort
Sumter in April 1861, the doors of the starting gate flew
open, and the dogs of war finally sprung free as the
American Civil War commenced. Immediately, the
Commander-in-Chief went to work. While coordinating
with U.S. Secretary of War Simon Cameron to reinforce
the southern border, he called upon his citizens to take up
arms and enlist. He ordered the presidents of the local
railroads to halt all shipments of “contraband” heading
south, and he instructed telegraph lines to cease all
communication that included troop movements. To lead the
troops, he tapped Captain George B. McClellan, known as
a wunderkind in military circles. To solidify strategy, the
chief called on all of the western governors for a
conference in Cleveland to discuss war strategy and an
invasion of the South. Furthermore, he aggressively
supported the separatist movement in western Virginia,
stationing an army at the border under McClellan, who later
invaded, routed the lingering Confederate forces, and
secured the government of what would become the new
state of West Virginia. 1
1

William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 158-59, 162-63; The War of the Rebellion: A
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Much has been written and debated about the “war
powers” of President Abraham Lincoln, especially in the
first months of his presidency before Congress convened.
But the aforementioned actions were not justified by the
President’s war powers, as they were not taken by President
Lincoln at all; rather, the leader described above is actually
William Dennison Jr., Governor and “Commander-inChief” of the state of Ohio at the outset of the Civil War.
Even as one of the more ineffective governors, especially in
managing finances and organizing the state militia,
Governor Dennison still clearly wielded an enormous
amount of power, not only in his own state but nationally.
Indeed, at the start of the war, the Union was truly that: a
union of (the remaining) states who at times acted
independently yet whose power was always compounded
when they acted in concert. The culmination of this united
power and influence was supposed to manifest itself at the
Loyal War Governors’ Conference of September 1862.
Also called the “Altoona Conference” for its
location at the central Pennsylvania railroad junction, the
gathering has mostly been relegated to the footnotes of
history, largely forgotten in the grand narratives of the Civil
War and the Lincoln administration. Indeed, events
immediately preceding the gathering—most notably the
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies (Cornell University Library, 1880-1901), series 3, I, 101-04;
Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Her Generals, and
Soldiers (New York: Moore, Wilstach, and Baldwin, 1868), 1: 41-42;
Richard H. Abbott, Ohio’s War Governors (Columbus, OH: Ohio State
University Press, 1962), 18-19.
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“victory” at the Battle of Antietam and the subsequent
announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation—
seemingly rendered the conference moot. When it is
mentioned, the Altoona Conference is characterized as
another one of the war’s “close calls” in which President
Lincoln escaped an organized revolt of his governors by the
favorable preceding events. Lincoln did surely respect the
prestige and power, both military and political, of the
governors. Nevertheless, this paper suggests that, far from a
surprise obstacle, the Altoona Conference was partly the
contrivance of Lincoln himself, who intended for it to be
linked to the Emancipation Proclamation and have it serve
as a political buttress for his most controversial presidential
order. 2
In order to properly assess the motivation for, and
significance of, the conference, it is important to first
examine the context of the conference and Lincoln’s
relationship with the governors. At the outset of the war,
most Northern states and their governors were extremely
enthusiastic about the war, with their constituents enlisting
in droves. In fact, the state of Ohio raised men so quickly
that there was no way to house or feed them all, and they
sat idly in the state capital, awaiting orders. The War
Department under Simon Cameron scrambled to gather
supplies and organize the mass of militia units scattered
across the cities of the North, yet it suffered from a fatal
lack of efficiency, especially in the face of complaints from
2

Tarring S. Davis and Lucile Shenk, eds. A History of Blair County
Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: National Historical Association, 1931), 1:
90.
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leaders in every state, each with his own opinion on the
correct course of action for both his army and the effort as a
whole. Each governor acted like a distinct “war minister”
with duties stretching from raising war funds to retrieving
the bodies of dead constituents to commissioning officers
in the regiments from his state. This last duty triggered
much friction with the War Department, as patronage
became a political battleground as the war progressed and
the armies of the nation became increasingly nationalized. 3
Nevertheless, all of the enthusiasm that burst forth
after Fort Sumter dwindled as the months dragged on, and
it was all but trampled after the First Battle of Bull Run,
when it became clear that the war would not simply be a
glorious march straight into Richmond. By the early
months of 1862, the governors and Lincoln Administration
were at a near stalemate over recruiting. The Radical
Republican governors, especially those in New England led
by the fiery John Andrew of Massachusetts, blamed
Lincoln’s policies for slow recruiting numbers as well as
the overall lack of progress in the war. The Radicals argued
that the dearth of enthusiasm stemmed from an uninspiring
foundation for the war itself; a public commitment that the
war was one definitively fought to erase the evil of slavery
3

Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 148-154; Reid, Ohio in
the War: Her Statesmen, Her Generals, and Soldiers, 1: 28; William B.
Weeden, War Government, Federal and State, in Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania and Indiana, 1861-1865 (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1906), xi-xii; Stephen Engle, All the President’s Statesmen:
Northern Governors and the American Civil War, ed. A. Kristen
Foster, Frank L. Klement Lectures 15 (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 2006), 11.
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would demoralize the South and rally the North in spirit
and manpower, leading to victory. Moreover, they desired
a purge of the army, replacing moderate or Democratic
generals such as McClellan with those such as John C.
Fremont, who was the darling of the Radicals for his
attempts to implement emancipation in Missouri against the
will of Lincoln. McClellan was detested by the Radicals,
who saw him as wholly incompetent and who were
outraged by his public stance against the emancipation of
slaves. 4
Lincoln had to resist the Radicals, although he
shared in some of their sentiments. Lincoln was by no
means ambivalent towards slavery, yet he was wary of
sudden, widespread emancipation across the nation. More
importantly, Lincoln was held in check by perpetual fear of
the reactions of the borders states; in many ways, the war,
and even the fate of the capital, rested on their placation.
But the Radicals, who controlled Congress, were constantly
attempting to ram through legislation to remold the war
effort into more of an abolitionist crusade. Lincoln, ever the
compromiser in a manner that would make his idol Henry
Clay proud, attempted to combat the wave of abolitionist
fervor with a moderate plan for compensated emancipation.
Although compensated emancipation was approved for
4

Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 242; William B.
Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the
Emancipation Proclamation,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History
and Biography 71, no. 3 (July 1947): 196; Alexander K. McClure,
Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times: Some Personal Recollections
of War and Politics during the Lincoln Administration (Philadelphia:
Times Publishing, 1892), 91.
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Washington D.C., Lincoln’s plan was met with disdain
from both sides of the issue, especially in in the Border
States. 5
By the summer of 1862, tensions between Lincoln
and the Radicals were rising with each passing day. After
McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign ended in utter failure,
additional troops were needed more than ever, yet the
governors seemed indifferent to this new call for troops,
which simply joined the continual stream of calls sent
throughout the year. Even when Washington itself was
supposedly threatened by General Stonewall Jackson,
response from the governors was sluggish. Thus, Lincoln
knew he must incite the governors politically. Secretary of
State Seward, acting in concert with Lincoln, left
Washington in late June of 1862 to personally call on the
mayors of Philadelphia, New York, and Boston in an
apparent attempt to bypass the governors and enlist the help
of the mayors. 6
The governors were greatly alarmed by this
development, fearing the power that would shift to Lincoln
if he were able to recruit without his “war ministers.”
Andrew Curtin, the pro-Lincoln governor of Pennsylvania,
intervened on behalf of his fellow leaders and met with
Seward while the Secretary was in New York. In a meeting
5

Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings: 1859-1865, ed. Don E.
Fehrenbacher (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1989),
585-6; McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 92;
Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 242-244; John G. Nicolay
and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History (New York: Century,
1890), 109-11.
6
Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, 113, 117-19.
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on June 30, 1862, at the Astor House, Governor Curtin,
Seward, and Governor Morgan of New York agreed that
the raising of troops was a gubernatorial prerogative, and
the governors agreed to affix their signatures to a public
letter, pre-written for them by Seward and Lincoln, stating
a belief that “the decisive moment [of the war] is near at
hand” and explicitly asking President Lincoln to call for
more reinforcements. This letter was then sent out to the
other governors, eighteen of whom signed the letterS some
even delivered the letters personally to the thankful
President. 7
Nevertheless, Andrew Curtin was not just another
one of the many governors with whom Lincoln and his
Cabinet had to deal in order to conduct the war effort.
Rather, Curtin and Lincoln were political allies, and the
President counted this particular governor as somewhat of a
confidant. Indeed, Curtin biographer Alexander McClure,
himself an influential Republican politician and patronagewielder in Pennsylvania, wrote:
Many circumstances combined to bring
Lincoln and Curtin into the closest official
and personal relations from Lincoln’s
[presidential]
nomination
until
his
death…the nomination of Lincoln was made
possible by two men – Henry S. Lane of
Indiana and Curtin of Pennsylvania…The
7

Hesseltine and Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation
Proclamation,” 197-99; Official Records, series 3, I, 181-82.
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appointment of [Curtin’s in-state rival]
Cameron to the Lincoln Cabinet was
regarded by Curtin as unfortunate, and
would have made very strained relations
between [them] had not both been singularly
generous in all their impulses and
actions…there was never a shadow upon the
relations of these two men. Curtin was
profoundly loyal and an enthusiast in
everything pertaining to the war. 8
Thus, when Seward met with Curtin in New York, the
governor was naturally a willing participant in the ploy to
aid his Commander-in-Chief.
The success of the
governors’ call for more troops—eventually allowing
Lincoln to settle on asking for an astounding 300,000 more
troops—was not likely lost on either man, especially
looking toward the future, with Lincoln’s relationship with
the other governors unlikely to ameliorate because of the
lingering dissension over war strategy. 9
With the failure of Lincoln’s attempts at seeking a
compromise regarding emancipation and increased pressure
from Radicals in Congress, the President began to chart a
new course. In late June of 1862, Lincoln undertook the
drafting of his Emancipation Proclamation; a month later,
Lincoln called together his Cabinet and surprised them with
his draft of the document. The following discussion
8

McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 232.
William Marvel, Lincoln’s Darkest Year: The War in 1862 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2008), 81-83.
9
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revealed a deeply divided Cabinet, much more so than
Lincoln had anticipated. Much of the criticism surrounded
the timing of the document, with Secretary Seward warning
of its possible effect on European nations eager to intervene
in the conflict. Thus, unbeknownst to the public or the
governors at large, Lincoln’s draft for emancipation was
tucked quietly into his desk, awaiting an opportune
moment. 10
In early September, a panic swept the North.
Confederate General Robert E. Lee, emboldened by recent
victories and hoping to influence the coming elections in
the North, invaded Maryland. Furthermore, to the outrage
of many of the Northern Governors, as well as his Cabinet,
Lincoln restored the cashiered McClellan to his command.
Secretary Chase, who as a Radical had no love for the
General and believed he “ought to be shot,” led a group of
Cabinet members in a confrontation with Lincoln in which
they delivered a signed protest regarding McClellan’s
service. Lincoln was forced to defend McClellan, arguing
that he was best equipped for defensive tactics in the area.
Furthermore, Lincoln had not only once again rejected calls
for the admittance of African-American soldiers, but he
openly threatened the governors with a possible national
draft. 11
10

Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 247-48; Guelzo,
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America,
118-24.
11
Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of
Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 478-79;
Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 250-52.

93

Thompson
With events unraveling in the capital, Governor
Andrew called a clandestine meeting of the New England
governors. Under the auspices of attendance at the
commencement ceremony of Brown University in
Providence, five of the six New England governors met
with three representatives from the National War
Committee, a newly established, Radical-dominated
committee based in New York. The governors discussed
their views on the war as well as the President’s policies
and Cabinet. After much discussion, those in attendance
formally agreed that “the unanimous choice of New
England was for a change of the cabinet and a change in the
generals” and sent the New York delegates to Washington
to convey their message. The delegates, upon their arrival,
met with Lincoln personally, yet they immediately clashed
with the President, who accused them of a zealous hatred
for Seward and dismissed their pleas as immaterial. 12
Lincoln was not wrong in his characterization of the
Radicals’ feelings towards his Secretary of State; the
Radical wing of the party had distrusted Seward since the
crisis at Ft. Sumter and the day his stint as Secretary of
State began. Specifically, they charged him with being too
complacent and conciliatory in his negotiations with the
South, paralleling the complacent McClellan, whom he
championed. Likewise, they believed Seward was the
greatest obstacle preventing the Lincoln Administration
from fully embracing abolitionism. This impression of
12

Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 252-53; Hesseltine and
Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation Proclamation,”
199.
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Seward was linked to the popular Radical belief that
Lincoln was ineffectual as president and was simply the
political puppet of Seward. Joseph Medill, a prominent
Republican as the editor of the partisan Chicago Tribune,
wrote: “Seward must be got out of the Cabinet. He is
Lincoln’s evil genius. He has been President de facto, and
has kept a sponge of chloroform to Uncle Abe’s nose all
the while, except one or two brief spells…” Thus,
Lincoln’s vehement defense of Seward to the New York
delegates did nothing to assuage the New England
governors’ fears of Lincoln’s inefficacy as the leader of his
administration. 13
It was in this contentious climate, perhaps the
“darkest hour of the war,” that the idea for a meeting of all
of the governors of the loyal states began to emerge.
Governor Andrew, incensed over Lincoln’s rebuff of the
New York delegates, arrogantly claimed to an acquaintance
that he was “sadly but firmly trying to organize some
movement, if possible, to save the president from the
infamy of ruining our country.” But Governor Andrew was
not alone in his sentiment. Leaders across the nation,
mostly Radicals, welcomed the idea of a governors’
conference, one whose result Lincoln would actually listen
to and perhaps even trigger his resignation. Indeed, there
was no denying that the unofficial grumblings for the

13

David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1995), 401; Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1899), 2: 361-64.
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conference had a distinct Radical and anti-Lincoln air about
them. 14
Governor Curtin, a disciple of Lincoln’s more
moderate approach to issues such as emancipation and the
Border States, was suspicious of the plans brewing and
believed that the governors should convene, not to assail
the President but to show their support. The first official
mention of the conference appeared when Governor Curtin
contacted Governor Andrew in early September of 1862. 15
Governor Curtin’s message was simple: “In the present
emergency, would it not be well if the loyal governors
should meet at some point in the Border States to take
measures for a more active support of the government?”
Andrew, who could not refuse such an offer and then
subsequently call for a conference himself, replied that he
would indeed attend such a conference. Within a week, an
14

Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 253.
Sources seem to conflict over the timing and the context of the
original conception of the official Altoona Conference. Several
reputable sources claim that the inspiration was born back when
Governor Curtin was in New York alongside Secretary Seward. Most
allude to the account of John Russell Young, who wrote an excerpt
entitled “Curtin and the Altoona Conference” for William Egle’s 1896
biography of Curtin. Young supposedly consulted an account by
Governor Austin Blair of Michigan for his information on the entire
conference. But Governor Blair was unable to attend the conference
itself, and it seems more likely that the incorrect assumption of the
inspiration occurring in New York stems from a misinterpretation of
Governor Curtin’s letter to A.K. McClure dated Feb. 16, 1892 (partly
reproduced below). By neglecting the wording in “Governor Andrew
afterward acquiesced, and I then wrote him…” (emphasis added), one
could mistakenly assume that Curtin’s and Andrew’s correspondence
occurred in a single event—coinciding with Curtin’s meeting with
Seward in New York on June 30-July 1, 1862.
15
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invitation was sent out to all of the governors from Curtin
as well as two of his fellow moderate governors: David Tod
of Ohio and Francis Harrison Pierpont of West Virginia. 16
Attendance at the conference was impressive,
considering the ten day notice and the present situation in
many of the states, with governors from the Midwest to
New England to the Border States. Nevertheless, very few
sparks flew when all of the delegates first assembled in the
Logan House on September 24. Civil War historian
William Hesseltine argues that the victory at Antietam and
subsequent Emancipation Proclamation, announced a mere
day before the conference, completely took the wind out of
the sails of the conference. He writes:
Hence the governors assembled in Altoona
with the Emancipation Proclamation
hanging over them. The astute Lincoln had
cut the ground from under the Radicals, and,
politicians as they all were, they knew it.
Governor Curtin, with an uncontrollable
twinkle
in
his
eye,
met
his
colleagues…[who included] Tod…and
Pierpont, a New England delegation of
Maine’s Israel Washburne, Rhode Island’s
William Sprague, and New Hampshire’s
Nathaniel Berry, a Midwestern group
consisting of Illinois’s Yates, Wisconsin’s
Edward Saloman, and Iowa’s Samuel
16

Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 254.
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Kirkwood, while Maryland’s Augustus
Bradford and New Jersey’s Charles Olden
represented eastern moderates. Indiana’s
Oliver P. Morton had sent one D.J. Rose as
his personal representative. New York’s
Edwin D. Morgan…had refused to attend.
Connecticut’s William Buckingham was still
enroute, and Michigan’s Austin Blair
was…too busy…to journey to Altoona. 17
Hesseltine argues that, despite the later defensive
protests from Republicans and even, once, from Lincoln
himself, the impending conference was extremely
influential in forcing the Emancipation Proclamation out of
the desk of Lincoln, or at least in its timing; with the threat
of a united front of governors against him looming, like
that emerging from their previous gathering in Providence,
Lincoln was forced to maneuver, albeit skillfully, and “cut
the ground” from under the Radicals. 18
By examining the account written by Governor
Curtin himself, however, we see a different picture of the
conference—and Lincoln’s relationship with his
governors—emerge. Instead of fearing the conference of
his governors as if it was some sort of attempted “Second
Hartford Convention,” as claimed later by the bitter
Democratic press, Lincoln actually embraced the idea of a
conference. Writing a letter years afterward to his good
17

Hesseltine and Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation
Proclamation,” 202.
18
Ibid., 196, 199-202.
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friend and political ally Alexander McClure, Curtin
recollected:
[After agreeing to the conference and
dispensing invitations]… Governor Andrew,
Governor Tod, and myself consulted Mr.
Lincoln, and he highly approved of our
purpose. In that interview he did not attempt
to conceal the fact that we were upon the
eve of an Emancipation policy, and he had
from us the assurance that the Altoona
conference would cordially endorse such a
policy. All that was done at the Altoona
conference had the positive approval of
President Lincoln in advance, and he well
understood that the whole purpose of the
movement was to strengthen his hands and
support the bolder policy that all then knew
was inevitable. The address presented to Mr.
Lincoln from the Altoona conference was
prepared by Governor Andrew and myself. I
did not then doubt that it would lose us the
coming election in Pennsylvania, and so said
to Mr. Lincoln, but I believed that the
country then knew what the war was about,
and that it was time to bring slavery to the
front as the great issue. 19

19

McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War-Times, 270-72.
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In this view, Lincoln was not forced to deviate from his
plans based on the conference nor outmaneuver his own
“war ministers.” Rather, Lincoln acted in a manner he so
desired from his generals: he observed the looming
possibility of a governors’ conference as an opportunity
and marched out to meet it head-on, welcoming it and
converting it into an advantage. Thus, the conference
became a boon for Lincoln, shoring up support
immediately after his issuance of the document which
would earn him the moniker “The Great Emancipator.” 20
The “address” to which Curtin refers is the final
result of the discussions of the conference, which was
published in newspapers as well as presented to Lincoln
himself in person. Although there was some discussion of
divisive topics such as the judgment of those in command,
with the radicals still out for the blood of McClellan, the
final document amounted to a simple yet stalwart
proclamation in favor of Lincoln’s most recent actions,
with the exception of the reinstatement of McClellan, who
was not mentioned anywhere in the document. In the
address, the Emancipation Proclamation was officially
supported, although it was far from worshipped by the
Radicals such Andrew, who later called it “a poor
document,” rife with strategic blunders, “but still a mighty
act.” Other provisions included those that expressed direct
loyalty to the President and his constitutional war powers,
asked him to raise and hold 100,000 men in reserve for
emergencies, and, of course, celebrated the heroism of the
20

Engle, All the President’s Statesmen, 21.
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Union soldiers. Although not all of the governors affixed
their signatures, including the elected chairman of the
conference, Governor Bradford, who heeded the desires of
his Border State constituents, twelve governors signed it
that day, with more afterwards, as some non-attending
governors endorsed it after it was sent to them. Indeed, the
mostly non-divisive final document could not have been
written better by Lincoln himself, who would benefit from
the united address of the governors endorsing his
Emancipation Proclamation. 21
Following the two-day conference, the attending
governors traveled to Washington and met with the
President in the White House on September 26. The
meeting began with an uncomfortable level of courtesy yet
was actually highly productive, as Lincoln listened
patiently to the governors’ suggestions on a myriad of
issues dealing with the logistics of the war effort, many
times even requesting written recommendations from the
governors. As the long interview progressed, the effects of
emancipation were discussed as was the war effort. Finally,
Governor Kirkwood of Iowa expressed concern over
General McClellan, the lack of confidence he engendered
around the nation, and even Lincoln’s own ability to
control him. In an account written nearly thirty years after
the fact, Governor Kirkwood recounts his version of both
the conference at Altoona and the resulting meeting with
21

Davis and Shenk, eds. A History of Blair County Pennsylvania, 1: 91;
William H. Egle and John Russell Young, Life and Times of Andrew
Gregg Curtin (Philadelphia: Thompson Publishing, 1896), 318-20;
Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 256.
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President Lincoln at the White House. On approaching
discussion of the contentious issue of McClellan’s
command, Kirkwood writes:
I said to the President that I spoke only for
the Iowa people; that in their judgment, Gen.
McClellan was unfit to command his army;
that his army was well clothed, well armed,
well disciplined, were fighting in a cause as
good as men ever fought for, and fought as
bravely as men ever fought, and yet were
continually whipped, and our people did not
think he was a good general who was always
whipped. Mr. Lincoln smiled in his genial
way and said “You Iowa people, then, judge
generals as you do lawyers, by their success
in trying cases.” I replied, “Yes, something
like that; the lawyer who is always losing his
cases especially when he was right and had
justice on his side, don’t get much practice
in Iowa.” 22
Nevertheless, the tone of the discussion shifted
starkly when Kirkwood pressed Lincoln, even going so far
as to suggest that “the administration [was] afraid to
remove Gen. McClellan.” Lincoln, with incredible
calmness and tact, stated: “If I believed our cause would be
22

Henry Warren Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel J. Kirkwood,
Iowa’s War Governor (Iowa City: Author, 1893), 229.
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benefited by removing General McClellan tomorrow, I
would remove him tomorrow. I do not believe so today, but
if the time shall come when I shall so believe, I will remove
him promptly, and not till then.” Thus, directly, honestly,
and laying out his full intentions before him—paralleling
the development of the Altoona Conference—Lincoln
deftly won over the situation, ending the meeting after that
very statement. 23
The view of the Altoona Conference as a more open
and direct contrivance departs from those that depict the
conference and its surrounding events as yet another lucky
escape by Lincoln from a political disaster. But it does not
necessarily signify that Lincoln was any more or less
politically savvy. In Hesseltine’s interpretation of events,
Lincoln faced a daunting showdown yet managed to not
only avoid losing the Border States or being steamrolled by
the Radicals but also to transform the situation into one in
which the governors reinforced him and personally handed
him a mandate on one of his most decisive decisions. In
this essay’s view, in which Lincoln welcomed the
conference, he is blessed with tremendous foresight,
recognizing opportunity in a conference of governors
before its conception. Furthermore, if Lincoln was being
truthful when Republicans, in the face of staunch
Democratic
conspiracy
theories
regarding
the
Emancipation Proclamation, extracted from him the
statement, “I never thought of the governors at all. When
23

Hesseltine and Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation
Proclamation,” 203-04; Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel J.
Kirkwood, 230; Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors, 260.
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Lee came over the Potomac, I made a resolve that if
McClellan drove him back I would send the Proclamation
after him,” then he certainly is the consummate genius of
political engineering—or at least the luckiest. 24
But this revised view of the Altoona Conference
and its connection to Lincoln’s actions raises numerous
tantalizing questions. What did Lincoln expect the political
climate to be like for the conference, considering he so
thoroughly embraced the idea of the conference in the
war’s darkest hour? Was he somehow certain of
McClellan’s impending victory, even though it would
eventually hinge on the improbable discovery of Lee’s
strategic plans for his Maryland Campaign? If not, and
without a victory to hang it on, how could Lincoln have
promised governors such as Curtin that the release of the
Emancipation Proclamation was imminent? Perhaps it is
possible that the Altoona Conference was even Lincoln’s
reserve card: grandly announcing emancipation alongside
his united “war ministers” at their conference of unyielding
support for the Union cause could be a powerful statement.
In fact, maybe the Altoona Conference would have become
the decisive event instead of Antietam, with endless
scholarship analyzing every key moment. The Altoona
Conference, although remaining a footnote in history,
seemingly raises more questions than answers. But these
are questions that allow us to better investigate and attempt
to understand the motivations and decisions of certainly
24

Hesseltine and Wolf, “The Altoona Conference and the
Emancipation Proclamation,” 195.
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one of the most enigmatic leaders in our nation’s history, a
true political general, and his approach towards a most
precarious expedition.

105

Thompson
Bibliography
Abbott, Richard H. Ohio’s War Governors. Columbus, OH:
Ohio State University Press, 1962.
Bancroft, Frederic. The Life of William H. Seward. Vol. 2.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1899.
Davis, Tarring S., and Lucile Shenk, eds. A History of Blair
County Pennsylvania. Vol. 1. Harrisburg: National
Historical Association, 1931.
Donald, David Herbert. Lincoln. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995.
Egle, William H., and John Russell Young. Life and Times
of Andrew Gregg Curtin. Philadelphia: Thompson
Publishing, 1896.
Engle, Stephen. All the President’s Statesmen: Northern
Governors and the American Civil War. Edited by
A. Kristen Foster. Frank L. Klement Lectures 15.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006.
Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals: The Political
Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2005.

106

“Altoona Was His, And Fairly Won”
Guelzo, Allen C. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation:
The End of Slavery in America. New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2004.
Hesseltine, William B. Lincoln and the War Governors.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.
Hesseltine, William B., and Hazel C. Wolf. “The Altoona
Conference and the Emancipation Proclamation.”
The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography 71, no. 3 (July 1947): 195-205.
Lincoln, Abraham. Speeches and Writings: 1859-1865.
Edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher. New York:
Literary Classics of the United States, 1989.
Marvel, William. Lincoln’s Darkest Year: The War in
1862. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2008.
McClure, Alexander K. Abraham Lincoln and Men of WarTimes: Some Personal Recollections of War and
Politics during the Lincoln Administration.
Philadelphia: Times Publishing, 1892.
Nicolay, John G., and John Hay. Abraham Lincoln: A
History. Vol. 6. New York: Century, 1890.
Ray, Leonard N. The Altoona War Conference of 1862.
Altoona: N.P., 1940.
107

Thompson
Reid, Whitelaw. Ohio in the War; Her Statesmen, Her
Generals, and Soldiers. Vol. 1. New York: Moore,
Wilstach, and Baldwin, 1868.
Scoyoc, Timothy Von. “The Loyal War Governors’
Conference.” Pennsylvania Legacies 4, no. 1 (May
2004): 12.
Shoemaker, Henry W. The Last of the War Governors: A
Biographical Appreciation of Colonel William
Sprague. Altoona: Altoona Tribune, 1916.
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 130
vols. Cornell University Library, 1880-1901.
Weeden, William B. War Government, Federal and State,
in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and
Indiana, 1861-1865. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1906.

108

